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Abstract:  We argue that two problems weaken the claims of those who link corruption 
and the exploitation of natural resources.  The first is conceptual.  Studies that use 
national level indicators of corruption fail to note that corruption comes in many forms, at 
multiple levels, and may or may not affect resource use.  Without a clear causal model of 
the mechanism by which corruption affects resources, one should treat with caution any 
estimated relationship between corruption and the state of natural resources.  The second 
problem is methodological: Simple models linking corruption measures and natural 
resource use typically do not account for other important causes and control variables 
pivotal to the relationship between humans and natural resources.  By way of illustration 
of these two general concerns, we demonstrate that the findings of a well known recent 
study that posits a link between corruption and decreases in forests, elephants, and 
rhinoceros are fragile to simple conceptual and methodological refinements.     
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The complex links between governance and biodiversity 
 
Introduction 
The importance of government corruption as an explanation for environmental 
degradation gained popularity with the drastic decline of forests and certain species of 
wildlife in the 1970s and 80s (e.g. Myers 1979; Hecht & Cockburn 1989; Gibson 1999; 
Ross 2001).  Indeed, it seems only commonsensical that politicians and officials with 
short time horizons and few legal checks on their power are likely to augment their 
wealth (and the wealth of their supporters) by supporting the over-harvesting of natural 
resources such as forests and wild animals.  It appears self-evident that corrupt politicians 
and bureaucrats in developing countries play a nontrivial role in environmental 
degradation.   
 
An increasing number of studies thus seek to make generalizable claims about this 
connection between corruption and environmental outcomes by testing hypotheses with 
cross national data.  Exploiting relatively new data sets that offer measures related to 
government quality, some analysts have found significant relationships between proxies 
for corruption and resource outcomes.  One of the most recent studies is Smith et al.’s 
(2003) analysis in Nature that finds strong relationships between corruption and the 
decline of elephant, rhinoceros, and forests.  Their results add empirical plausibility to 
arguments directly linking corruption and biodiversity loss. 
 
But the relationship between corruption and natural resources is far more complex than is 
captured in current work and this complexity may be lost in attempts at simple 
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generalizations.  For example, countries practicing “good governance” may also 
overexploit resources.  Where poverty is widespread and the population uniformly prefers 
to degrade resources in order to bolster current consumption, an honest, responsive, and 
representative government may advance policies that run counter to conservation goals.  
Moreover, corruption can appear at different levels of government, whereas the available 
indices of government performance and quality are only measured at the national level.  
We have worked in tropical countries whose central governments have a reputation for 
relatively low levels of corruption, yet in remote regions local officials contribute 
demonstrably to habitat and biodiversity loss.  Finally, not all forms of corruption lead to 
overexploitation.  Wanton nepotism in a government does not necessarily lead to assaults 
on biodiversity; neither does the stealing of tax monies, the extraction of bribes at 
customs booths, etc.  Countries with such characteristics may be ranked as corrupt, but 
such corruption may have little to do with the natural resources.  The links between 
politics and environmental outcomes, therefore, are unlikely to be captured well by 
simple models and inappropriate statistical tests.   
 
In this brief essay, we explore two fundamental issues about cross-national studies 
attempting to link corruption and environmental outcomes.  The first is conceptual, and 
turns on how corruption is used to infer causality.  Corruption and environmental 
outcomes are commonly both the result of sets of political and economic institutions at 
different levels that are weak or missing (Barrett et al. 2001).  Consequently, corruption 
and natural resources might be related, but not in the causal ways commonly posited in 
simple models.  For example, weakness in enforcing rules even at the community level 
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can foster both corruption and overexploitation of natural resources (Gibson, Ostrom & 
Williams 2005).  Inference with respect to the relationship between corruption and 
conservation requires far more nuance than commonly appears in published studies.   
 
The second fundamental issue relates to the statistical methods appropriate to testing 
hypotheses using cross-national data.  Methodological weaknesses in such analyses – 
incomplete data, improper research designs, and inadequate tests – often lead to invalid 
conclusions about how corruption may influence the stocks of forests, elephant, and 
rhinoceros.  Such concerns are familiar to social scientists, e.g., from the extensive  
literature on economic growth based on cross-country regressions (Barro 1997; Durlauf 
& Quah 1999), but perhaps less mainstream within conservation science, although a large 
number of economic studies of tropical deforestation with relatively sophisticated 
methods have existed since the late 1980s (Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998).  While an 
understanding of how politics – like corruption – affect resource outcomes is surely 
required for better policymaking, simple causal models may at best be misleading, and at 
worst counterproductive.   
 
To explore these two issues, we use the prominent Smith et al. (2003) study as a foil to 
unpack the important issues that analysts need to address when seeking to explain the 
links between corruption and outcomes on the landscape.  Smith et al.’s study uses 
national level indicators of corruption and biodiversity in a cross national design, and find 
that there are significant and negative relationships between the two.   
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Explaining the Links between Corruption and Natural Resources 
There is growing interest in the effect of government quality on economic, political and 
environmental outcomes.  It is widely accepted that governments that are less corrupt and 
that have more efficient bureaucracies – i.e., have better “governance” – produce more 
effective policy  (Tendler 1997).  Indeed several policies emanating from donors, 
watchdog non-governmental organizations and trade groups seek to incorporate explicitly 
measures to foment the better governance of forest resources, for example Transparency 
International’s Forest Integrity Network, the International Tropical Timber 
Organization’s policy forum on criminal activity in the forest sector, the U.S. 
Government’s Congo Basin Initiative,  and the Center for International Forestry 
Research’s newly-created forest governance division.  The World Bank also emphasizes 
the role of good governance within its forest sector strategy as well as more broadly in its 
poverty reduction programs.  The objective of checking the abuse of power by officials is 
laudable.  And the United States’s Millennium Challenge account is beginning to link the 
process of good government with environmental measures in deciding how to allocate its 
portfolio of foreign aid. 
 
But what are we talking about when speak of corruption?  Are these “bad” officials 
politicians, bureaucrats, some combination of the foregoing groups, or something else?  
Do the bad officials occupy national, regional, or local offices?   In a recent summary of 
lessons learned in natural resource conservation activities in Africa, the United States 
Agency for International Development (2002) emphasizes the importance of good 
governance at the local level.  Yet most studies of corruption use national level indicators 
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since they are compiled by organizations concerned largely with central government 
functioning (often relation to urban-based commerce and multinational agencies).  The 
potential mismatch of actors and scales of analysis should be cause for concern.  Further, 
do all of these officials have the same amount of power to affect resource stocks?  Does 
the nature of the laws of a country, or even its physical characteristics facilitate 
corruption? Given all the possible sub national variation, a single measure of corruption 
at the national level seems highly unlikely to capture the true relationship between 
corruption and resource outcomes.   
 
Empirical research using cross-country data to explore the government-related causes of 
deforestation in particular has grown rapidly since the early 1990s.  Earlier case study 
research found that weak property rights were associated with loss of forest cover (Gillis 
1980; Repetto & Gillis 1988; Vincent 1990; Southgate et al. 1991; Alston et al. 1996; 
Godoy et al. 1996; Pinchon 1997).  Using panel data, cross national studies substantiated 
this claim (Deacon 1994, 1999; Bohn & Deacon 2000).  These studies did not measure 
corruption per se, but rather factors directly affected by governments that might affect 
forests.   
 
However, modeling the relationship between forests and an attribute of a government at 
the national level – like corruption – rather than a policy output – like property rights – is 
a far more difficult endeavor.  Attributes may or may not affect any single policy area: a 
corrupt government may be less corrupt in one sector -- or at one level -- than another.  
More importantly, attributes do not reveal the mechanism by which it becomes 
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observable on the forest.  There are dozens of strategies through which officials can 
transfer the benefits of natural resources from the state to themselves, i.e., act corruptly 
(Callister 1992; Contreras-Hermosilla 1997; de Bohan et al. 1996; Krishnaswamy & 
Hanson 1999).  Politicians and bureaucrats can sell or exchange the resource; give 
permits to friends, family, and political supporters; cut off a person’s legal right to a 
resource; and intentionally under-enforce laws that conserve resources (Ascher 1999).  
Further, a corrupt action may have the same observable effect on a forest as an honest 
action:  intentional under-enforcement due to corruption may have the same outcome on 
a resource as unintentional under- enforcement due to lack of government resources, i.e. 
in both cases lots of trees may be cut or elephants killed.  Thus any theory about the 
connection between corrupt behavior and resource outcome needs to specify the causal 
mechanism(s) precisely in order to test the causal mechanism of the hypothesized 
relationship if empirical results are to lead to robust findings.  Simple correlation tests 
between two variables measured at the national level will be hard pressed to capture these 
different mechanisms. 
 
In trying to account for the mechanism by which corruption causes changes in 
biodiversity, Smith et al. (2003) offer four reasons to expect that corrupt officials subvert 
conservation: conservation project funding is easy to misappropriate, bribery is common, 
conservation departments have little enforcement capability, and oversight is difficult.  
These are all plausible theories, and each may indeed be associated with a different, 
malfunctioning set of institutions.  But the authors neither specify nor test these 
arguments.  Instead, they employ correlation and regression analysis to test the 
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association between governance and standard national level measures of human welfare.   
As we demonstrate in the next section, these sorts of ad hoc empirical specifications are 
not robust to even modest adjustments through the incorporation of additional 
observations or other plausible explanatory variables.  As a result of the absence of 
clearly articulated and directly tested causal channels and the fragility of the resulting 
statistical findings, it becomes difficult to know what to make of results purporting to link 
corruption causally to conservation outcomes.  
 
Testing for corruption 
Even disregarding the conceptual problems of these approaches, tests such as Smith et 
al.’s offer few grounds to be persuaded that national level measures of governance have 
any robust relationship with environmental outcomes.  In their investigation of forests, 
for example, Smith et al. use two different dependent variables, change in total forest 
cover and change in natural forest cover from 1990 to 1995, to estimate the correlations 
between forests and governance. The authors compute bivariate Spearman correlation 
coefficients of change in forest cover on the means of national governance scores (on 
which, more below), per capita gross domestic product (GDP), Human Development 
Index (HDI) score, and population density.  They find that change in total forest cover 
correlates positively with per capita GDP and governance, but change in natural forest 
cover does not correlate with governance.  The authors therefore suggest that the “result 
for total cover was driven by the establishment of new plantations in wealthier, better-
governed countries” (p.68).   
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These conclusions are not robust.  Simple and desirable changes to the statistical methods 
used completely change their outcomes. First, if we are to isolate the effect of corruption 
on forest cover across countries, a test must control for change in other variables that are 
likely to be correlated with both corruption and forest cover.  Second, the comparison of 
natural and total forest covers is simply invalid because it uses different samples.  The 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports forest cover for all 
countries, but reports natural forest cover only for developing nations.  Thus a correct test 
of the difference between determinants of natural forest cover versus total forest cover 
must restrict the total forest cover to developing countries.  Otherwise the results may 
simply reflect different samples.  If we restrict total forest cover to developing countries 
and use multivariate tests to control for all of Smith et al.’s factors (the sample size can 
easily accommodate multivariate tests) we find that neither per capita GDP nor 
governance have any statistically significant relation to changes in total forest cover, 
while HDI is now negatively related to forest cover and barely statistically significant at 
the 10% level (Table 1).1   
 
We can reveal the effect of sample selection bias graphically (Figure 1).  The graph 
reveals two clusters of countries, (1) a relatively large group with low governance scores 
                                                          
1 Data for change in forest cover, corruption, per capita GDP, Human Development Indicators, and 
population density are precisely those used by Smith et al. (available online at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v426/n6962/extref/nature02025-s1.pdf).  Because we have one 
observation per country, we estimate the model using ordinary least squares and correct for 
heteroskedasticity.    
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and negative changes in forest cover (marked with Xs) and (2) a relatively small group 
with high governance scores and positive forest cover change (marked with circles).  The 
Xs represent developing countries; the circles represent developed countries.  The graph 
also shows two best fit lines.  The thick line is the best fit for developing countries; the 
thin line is the best fit for all countries.  The slope of line for developing countries is 
statistically indistinguishable from the zero-slope line at conventional significance levels.   
Thus, the only defensible inference to draw is that forest cover tended to increase in 
developed countries and decrease in developing countries between 1990 and 1995.  There 
are few policy implications from such a result.  
 
Third, the authors correlate the change in forest cover with mean governance score over a 
single period.  The implications one can draw from such tests are unclear.  An average 
cannot identify whether conditions are improving, deteriorating, or unchanged, so one 
cannot infer that improvements in governance would lead to increased forest cover.  A 
more policy oriented research design would at least test the change in the stock of a 
natural resource on changes of governance, or levels of resource at time (t) and (t+1) on 
governance levels at (t) and (t+1).  If we revisit Smith et al.’s data changes in forest cover 
and in governance, rather than levels, the correlation between the change in governance 
and change in forest cover is -0.21, neither positive nor statistically significant. Simple 
correlations of levels cannot adequately capture the relationship between biological, 
economic, and political factors.   
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Smith et al. use similar techniques to analyze the relation between corruption and 
populations of African elephants and black rhinoceroses.  As in their study of forests, 
they test the effects of governance, per capita GDP, mean HDI, and mean population 
density, as well as a measure of spending per km2 of protected area within countries, on 
changes in African elephant populations.  In these tests the authors use stepwise 
regression, and find that only mean governance scores for the period 1987 - 1994 explain 
the change in these populations.  The authors conclude that “These results suggest that 
political corruption may play a considerable role in determining the success of national 
strategies to conserve these two flagship species, despite the international attention they 
both attract” (p.68). 
 
But once again, these results are not robust.  For the sake of brevity, we focus here just on 
the inferences with respect to African elephants.  By adding more data from the same 
series to their study, and including the appropriate controls due to their omitted relevant 
variables, Smith et al. results change completely. 
 
Data exist for African elephants over three periods from the same data series, the African 
Elephant Database 1987 (Burrill & Douglas-Hamilton 1987), 1994 (Said et al. 1995), 
1997 (Barnes et al. 1999), and 2002 (Blanc et al. 2003), although Smith et al. only use 
two.  The numbers Smith et al. use for the 1987 elephant numbers do not correspond to 
the African Elephant Database.  By email communication, Dr. Smith wrote that he 
received new data from someone within the IUCN: Ghana (3,900), Kenya (35,000), 
Tanzania (100,000), and Uganda (3,000).    It turns out that the correlation between 
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change in elephant population and national level corruption is highly sensitive to specific 
time periods:  the correlation is 0.40 between 1987 and 1997, but changes to -0.32 
between 1997 an 2002.  And the inclusion of appropriate control variables completely 
changes the results.  By simply including a country’s latitude changes the results; latitude 
in fact better explains change in elephant populations than does the national corruption 
measure.  Using the Smith et al.’s data, a regression of the change in elephant population 
on governance and latitude yields the following equation (p-value in parentheses): change 
in elephant = -73.8 (<.01) + 10.1* Governance (0.14) + -2.4*Latitude (<.01); R-squared 
= 0.78; N = 20.  
 
Further, the specific features of each specific resource must be considered before trying 
to model the relationship between corruption and biodiversity.  The set of factors that 
account for elephant population change, for example, are highly unlikely to account for 
changes in forest cover.  In studying elephants we would argue that factors regarding 
basic anthropogenic and biophysical factors likely affect to elephant fertility and 
mortality should be included.  So as a simple check on the Smith et al. study’s robustness, 
we regressed the annual growth rate in national elephant population on the natural 
logarithm of the lagged elephant population – the coefficient on which then reflects the 
effect of a one percent change in base period population on the rate of growth, also 
measured in percentage terms – and rainfall, as two basic variables likely to affect 
population growth rates.  (We estimate the annual average (compound) growth rate in 
elephant population between survey periods using the formula POPs+t= (1+r)tPOPs where 
t is years between counts, r is the annual growth rate, and s is the initial period.  Because 
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we would expect forest and savannah elephants to respond differently at the same levels 
of rainfall, given the stark difference in their habitats, we use deviations from country-
specific mean average annual rainfall levels as our explanatory variable, from 1987-2002.  
Source: Global Historical Climatological Network (2004).) 
 
Since it is obvious that human activity have a great deal to do with elephant numbers, we 
employ two anthropogenic factors in our analysis: the presence of civil war, and tourists 
per hectare of protected area.  The civil war data counts the existence of civil war in a 
country (by convention, intrastate conflict with more than a 1000 human deaths) 
(Gleditsch & Ward 2004). Tourist data come from the World Bank (2004).  Finally, we 
include a measure of corruption.  Standard measures of corruption, like the ones used by 
Smith et al., provide a single, national level of corruption for a country annually.  They 
employ use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measure (CPI website: 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html).  But CPI data does not cover the years 
for which they have data on their dependent variables, so they construct their measure of 
corruption using another well- measure of corruption, International Country Risk Guide.  
These two measures of corruption are highly correlated and widely known.  We use the 
latter as it covers the entire period under investigation and is thus more precise. 
 
Our hypotheses about these factors and their associated measures are in Table 2. Data for 
elephant populations are from all periods covered by the African Elephant Database.  We 
must add the caution, however, that the editors of the elephant database specifically warn 
against empirical studies like Smith et al.’s or the results we now present, because 
 14
contributors to these reports make clear that different counting methods over space and 
time were used, making comparisons between counts tenuous.2   
 
With that important caveat in mind, we regress the growth rate of national-level elephant 
population on its lagged level and our explanatory variables (Table 3).  We estimate the 
model using panel data-corrected standard errors since lagged variables are included and 
we wish to account for possible heteroskedasticity in the regression errors.  The results 
suggest that two anthropogenic factors – civil war and tourists per protected area – are 
significant predictors of African elephant population change.  Civil wars reduce elephant 
populations through mortality (more humans with guns in these zones seek meat and 
cash) and elephant outmigration.  Since no data exist on the actual spatial dispersion of 
tourists or on conservation enforcement levels over the sample frame, we use tourists per 
protected area as a proxy, since the presence of tourists can increase elephants through 
both the informal enforcement effect of tourists, increased government agents in the field 
due to tourists, and the incremental revenue tourists provide for conservation activities.   
 
Biophysical factors also matter to elephant population stocks.  Population dynamics 
appear to be convex over the sample range in that estimated growth rates are positively 
and significantly related to the lagged stock level.  Stocks are also increasing in rainfall, 
                                                          
2 The sampling error of the most widely used counting protocols – e.g. dung count and aerial surveys – are 
also different, and they are also used in different ratios from year to year in different countries.  In some 
cases, more accurate protocols for counting would lead to a decline in the number of elephants reported, 
regardless of other factors (R. Barnes, editor of 1995, 1998, 2002 African Elephant Databases, personal 
communication, December 2003).   
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which others have attributed to rainfall’s effect on elephant fecundity, infant mortality, 
and local labor supply for poaching (Barrett & Arcese 1998).  Once we control for these 
plausible anthropogenic and biophysical conditioning factors, however, corruption levels 
no longer have any explanatory power (and using level rather than the change in elephant 
population as the dependent variable yields similar results).  This once again underscores 
how fragile apparent statistical relationships between measures of central government 
corruption and conservation outcomes such as forest cover or the population of a 
protected species.  Although anecdotal and simple statistical evidence leads observers to 
hypothesize about connections between corruption and conservation, without careful and 
explicit modeling of the pathways through which such effects might occur, empirical 
exercises such as those popularized in recent years are likely to generate fragile, even 
misleading results.   
 
Conclusion 
There is growing interest in explaining conservation outcomes through political 
processes.  This is certainly an appropriate direction in which to push research; no 
resource is immune from the direct or indirect forces resulting from government policy or 
the political process (Ascher 1999).  But studies of the links between corruption and 
outcomes on the landscape will need more careful modeling and testing than has been the 
norm to date.  We discussed the many ways that corruption may be linked to 
overexploitation, each representing a different causal path from human action to 
environmental outcome.  And we showed the fragility of simple studies.  The links 
between national governments and natural resources are many and tangled.  Additional 
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work attempting to bridge the social and natural sciences is clearly needed to better 
explain these important and complex relationships. 
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Table 1: Forest cover for all countries and developing countries 
 
 Forest Cover 
(All countries) 
[Smith et al.] 
Forest cover  
(Developing countries only) 
Population density -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.52) (0.19) (0.89) (0.42) (0.49) (0.52) 
governance 0.232   0.135   
 (7.03)c   (1.03)   
HDI  1.956   -1.263  
  (4.08)c   (1.77)a  
Per capita GDP   0.000   0.000 
   (6.54)c   (1.47) 
Constant -1.702 -1.930 -0.954 -1.507 -0.307 -1.166 
 (9.46)c (6.09)c (8.03)c (3.36)c (0.82) (8.31)c 
Observations 94 88 93 66 60 65 
R-squared 0.28 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Robust t statistics in parentheses  
a significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Hypotheses, variables, and measures for elephant analysis  
 
Hypotheses Measures 
Previous level of elephants to control for 
potential nonlinear elephant population 
dynamics. 
Lagged elephant population level, from African 
Elephant Database (various years). 
Rainfall affects fecundity/infant mortality
as well as local labor supply for poaching 
Change in three year average of rainfall before 
elephant count (elephants have 24 month 
gestation).  Source: Global Historical 
Climatology Network (2004) 
Civil war increases elephant poaching Occurrence of civil war in country at time of 
count.  Source: Gleditsch (2004) 
Increased conservation enforcement 
decreases elephant poaching  
Change in number of tourists per hectare of 
protected area.  Source: World Bank (2004).  
Corruption decreases elephants due to 
increased, unsustainable (potentially 
illegal) offtake. 
Change in ICRG measure of corruption 
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Table 3: Panel-Corrected standard errors model for growth rate 
of elephants 
 
Log of lag level of elephants  0.02 
 (2.26)b 
Civil war -0.10 
 (3.95)c 
Change in tourists per hectare of 
protected area 
0.03 
 (2.22)b 
Change in rainfall 0.08 
 (1.74)a 
Change in corruption 0.03 
 (1.19) 
Constant -0.18 
 (2.39)b 
Observations 45 
R-Squared (overall) 0.37 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
 a significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; c significant at 1% 
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Figure Legends 
 
The cluster of Xs represents developing countries and the cluster of circles represents 
developed countries.  The thick line with the relatively flat slope is the best fit line for 
developing countries; the thin line with the positive slope is the best fit for all countries. 
 
 
 
